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People v. Thomas: The Conditional Guilty
Plea
I. Introduction
The traditional guilty plea finally disposes of the case in
that it waives a defendant's right to appeal any issue except
those issues relating to the validity of the plea itself, or to the
jurisdiction of the court.1 New York State's Criminal Procedure
Law section 710.70(2)' has modified the traditional guilty plea
by giving a defendant the right to appeal a denial of a motion to
suppress evidence. The conditional guilty plea, by contrast, is
the result of an agreement between the prosecutor, the trial
judge, and the defendant whereby the plea is conditioned upon
the defendant's ability to appeal certain issues of law.3 In People
v. Thomas,' the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize
a conditional guilty plea attempting to preserve for appeal issues
outside the scope of section 710.70(2), at least where "[t]he legal
sufficiency of a conceded set of facts" to support the guilty plea
was challenged. 5
In Thomas, the defendant pleaded conditionally guilty to
1. The traditional guilty plea is discussed more fully in Part H of this note infra.
See infra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
2. Naw YoRK CraM. PRoc. LAW § 710.70 (2) (McKinney 1971). Section 710.70(2)
allows appeals from denials of motions to suppress evidence which is the fruit of an
illegal search and seizure, eavesdropping, involuntary statement, or identification, N.Y.
CaM. Paoc. LAw § 710.20(1), (3) & (5) (McKinney Supp. 1980). N.Y. Cram. Paoc. LAw §
710.70(2) provides:
An order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon
an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that
such judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty.
3. But cf. United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing the
plea over the government's objection). The defendant would be permitted to withdraw
his plea should his appeal succeed. See generally J.E. BoND, PLEA BARGAIMG AND
GuLTY PLEAS § 7.22(2) (1978). The conditional guilty plea differs from section 710.70(2)
in that the defendant's right to appeal under section 710.70(2) is unilateral; it requires
neither the consent of the district attorney nor of the trial judge.
4. 53 N.Y.2d 338, 424 N.E.2d 537, 441 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1981).
5. Id. at 340, 424 N.E.2d at 538, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
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reckless endangerment in the first degree,' and criminal posses-
sion of a weapon in the third7 and fourth degrees. The plea allo-
cution, agreed to by the prosecutor and acquiesced to by the
trial judge, was offered on the condition that the defendant
would be able to appeal two specific claims. First, Thomas
claimed that the facts, as a matter of law, did not constitute
reckless endangerment.9 Second, he contended that the use of
New York's statutory presumption of possession of weapons
found in a motor vehicle was unconstitutional. 0
6. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 1975).
7. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1980).
8. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (McKinney 1980).
9. The stipulated facts in Thomas's plea allocution provided the record upon which
the appellate courts were to rule. Both parties agreed that Thomas was driving his vehi-
cle through Brooklyn on June 10, 1977 at 2:30 am. when a police vehicle pursued him.
Thomas reached speeds of over 60 m.p.h. and "ran" five traffic lights during the twenty-
five block chase. He admitted to passing at least four moving cars and a number of
parked cars, but claimed to have seen no pedestrians on the street. For this reason
Thomas argued that these facts could not, as a matter of law, establish that he acted
"under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life ... recklessly en-
gage[d] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of death to another person," as required
by the statute. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25. Essentially, Thomas asked the reviewing court
to treat his conviction of this charge as if it were the result of a jury trial rather than a
plea of guilty, and to rule that the above facts, as a matter of law, did not evidence the
requisite state of mind to constitute the felony of reckless endangerment. He offered his
plea of guilty to this charge only because he believed that the district attorney could
establish these facts at trial, and that a jury, on the basis of these facts, would convict
him. See Defendant's Allocution, Brief for Defendant-Appellant, People v. Thomas, 74
A.D.2d 317, 428 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1980).
10. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1980) provides in relevant part:
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus,
of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, bomb, bombshell, gravity knife,
switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuckles, sandbag
or slingshot is presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying
such automobile at the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found....
Thomas originally claimed that this presumption statute, which the district attorney
conceded would be necessary to gain a conviction at trial on the weapon charges, was
unconstitutional.
The trial court denied his motion to dismiss the charges. The stipulated facts re-
vealed that the weapons were found beneath the rear seat of the car Thomas was driving,
and that there were two passengers in the car. At the time of defendant's allocution the
Second Circuit held the presumption statute unconstitutional on its face. Allen v.
County Court, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977). However, in the interim, the Supreme Court
reversed in County Court of Ulster City v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). This decision
effectively blocked any potential federal habeas corpus claim Thomas may have had.
Consequently, Thomas could only assert before the appellate courts that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the facts. Cf. County Court of Ulster City v. Allen, 442
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The court affirmed the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment," and agreed that preservation of such legal issues for ap-
pellate review was logically inconsistent with the plea itself."2
Thomas correctly prohibited the use of a procedural device
designed to circumvent the finality of the traditional guilty plea
and of the plea bargaining process. Acceptance of a conditional
guilty plea would impermissibly extend the plea bargaining pro-
cess by not only allowing pleas to reduced charges, but by also
permitting adverse pre-trial rulings to survive for appellate re-
view. The court, however, left "for another day consideration of
other permutations of the problem,"' and limited its holding to
the facts of the instant case.
Part II of this note discusses the legal consequences of a
guilty plea and examines the development of the conditional
guilty plea. Part III outlines the reasoning of both the appellate
division and the court of appeals in rejecting this procedure.
Part IV agrees with the results, but carries the analysis further
by refuting arguments often asserted by proponents of the con-
ditional guilty plea. This note concludes that Thomas represents
an appropriate limitation to plea bargaining.
II. Background
A. The Legal Consequences of the Traditional Guilty Plea
The finality of the common law traditional guilty plea has
been extensively developed in a series of Supreme Court cases
which have become known as the Brady Trilogy.'4 The tradi-
U.S. 140 (1979) (statute held constitutional as applied to convict four occupants of a
vehicle of possession of two large caliber handguns found in an open bag on either the
front floor or front seat on the passenger side).
11. People v. Thomas, 74 A.D.2d 317, 428 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1980). Because
Thomas's guilty plea was offered only on the condition that his claim be heard on ap-
peal, the appellate division, in fairness to him, remanded to allow him an opportunity to
plead anew. Id. at 326, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 27. Since Thomas's plea was vacated by the
appellate division, he was not the aggrieved party on the appeal to the New York Court
of Appeals. Therefore, it was the district attorney who sought leave to appeal. The court
was thus in the unusual position of listening to both adversarial parties argue for the
conditional guilty plea.
12. People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d at 344, 424 N.E.2d at 540, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
13. Id.
14. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the
1982]
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tional guilty plea preserves for appeal only those issues relating
to the jurisdiction of the court," or to the validity of the plea
itself.1 e Appeals of nonjurisdictional claims are foreclosed, 17 and
Brady Trilogy]. Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), is an extension of this line of
cases. As Toilet summarized:
[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in
the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
court that he is in fact guilty of the offenses with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice
he received from counsel was not "within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases."
Id. at 267 (citation omitted).
15. Jurisdictional defects void a conviction even if factual guilt is admitted. Thus, a
guilty plea would not waive the following: a double jeopardy claim, Menna v. New York,
423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975); a claim that the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction, Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974); or a claim that the statute under which the prosecution is
brought is unconstitutional, Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.2 (1968).
In New York, the leading cases are: People v. Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 365 N.E.2d 872,
396 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1977) (guilty plea does not waive a claim that the indictment is defec-
tive and does not effectively charge the defendant with the commission of a crime); Peo-
ple v. Armlin, 37 N.Y.2d 167, 332 N.E.2d 870, 371 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1975) (guilty plea does
not waive a claim that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial); People v. Blakely, 34
N.Y.2d 311, 313 N.E.2d 763, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1974) (claims based upon the constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial survive a plea of guilty); People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 394
N.E.2d 1134, 50 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1979) (failure to timely raise a double jeopardy claim
does not waive that claim).
16. Guilty pleas have been invalidated when made in the face of a federal statute
providing for the death penalty only after a jury conviction, United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968); when taken without the assistance of counsel, Pennsylvania ex rel.
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); when the prosecutor conditioned an offer to
recommend a reduced plea on defendant's promise to withdraw his claim that his right
to a speedy trial had been violated, People v. Blakely, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 313 N.E.2d 763,
357 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1974); when tainted by uncontradicted evidence that it was motivated
by prison abuses directly involving the defendant, People v. Flowers, 30 N.Y.2d 315, 284
N.E.2d 557, 333 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1973); when evidence of inadequate representation of
counsel existed, People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 234 N.E.2d 687, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659
(1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969); when the trial judge erroneously accepted a
plea of guilty, without further inquiry, to a charge of second degree murder when defen-
dant's version of the incident indicated that he may not have acted with the requisite
legal intent to kill, People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 206 N.E.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386
(1965); when the court accepted a plea of guilty to a felony charge where the underlying
facts did not support more than a misdemeanor charge, People v. Englese, 7 N.Y.2d 83,
163 N.E.2d 869, 195 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959); and when the plea was based upon unkept
promises by the state, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); People v. Selikoff, 35
N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
17. A valid plea of guilty waives any nonjurisdictional pre-trial or trial objections,
whether or not of a constitutional nature. See, e.g., People v. lannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589,
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federal courts will not adjudicate these claims following a valid
plea of guilty whether on direct review from the lower federal
courts,18 the state courts,10 or in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings.20 A valid plea of guilty finally disposes the nonjurisdic-
tional issues in the case; "nothing remains but to give judgment
and determine punishment." ' This is because, as the Supreme
Court stated in Menna v. New York, 2 "a counseled plea of
guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where vol-
untary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of fac-
tual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a suffi-
cient basis for the State's imposition of punishment.' 3
Serious legal consequences for the defendant flow from a
valid plea of guilty. One court has described the guilty plea as
"the most devastating waiver possible under our Constitution."2 4
When a defendant pleads guilty he is surrendering an array of
constitutional rights; foremost among them are the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination," and the sixth amend-
ment rights to a jury trial' and to confront one's accusers.'7
A criminal defendant may not unilaterally tender or with-
draw his plea of guilty.'8 Constitutionally, a judge cannot accept
384 N.E.2d 656, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1978); People v. Gilliam, 65 A.D.2d 533, 409 N.Y.S.2d
400 (3d Dep't 1977); People v. O'Neil, 44 A.D.2d 830, 355 N.Y.S.2d 21 (3d Dep't 1974);
People v. Smith, 41 A.D.2d 893, 342 N.Y.S.2d 513 (3d Dep't 1973); People v. Hendricks,
31 A.D.2d 982, 297 N.Y.S.2d 838 (3d Dep't 1969). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1964).
18. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
19. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 795 (1970).
20. See Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970).
21. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
22. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
23. Id. at 62 n.2 (emphasis added).
24. State v. Barnett, 240 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1977). In Brady, the Supreme Court
described the guilty plea as "a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and
discernment." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748.
25. In re D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, cert. denied sub nom.
D. v. County of Onondaga, 403 U.S. 926 (1971).
26. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
28. In New York, prior to sentencing, the court, in its discretion, may permit a de-
fendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAw § 220.60(3) (McKinney
1980).
After sentencing, a guilty plea can be set aside by a motion to vacate the judgment.
5
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:101
a guilty plea unless the record discloses that the plea is offered
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."9 A guilty plea, how-
ever, is not an express admission of factual guilt, nor is such an
admission constitutionally required before the plea can be ac-
cepted."0 Thus, "[a]n individual accused of crime may volunta-
rily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition
of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit
his participation in the acts constituting the crime." '81
Despite the significant and almost irreversible impact the
guilty plea has upon a defendant's rights, the vast majority of
criminal cases are disposed of through guilty pleas.8 ' These pleas
are typically "bargained"88 in that the defendant agrees to
forego his right to trial in return for more lenient treatment by
If the defendant maintains his innocence to the crime, the trial judge must inquire into
the claim. See People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 234 N.E.2d 687, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1968). A plea of guilty to a jurisdictionally defective indict-
ment must be vacated, see People v. Englese, 7 N.Y.2d 83, 163 N.E.2d 869, 195 N.Y.S.2d
64 (1959), as must a coerced plea of guilty, see People v. Farina, 2 N.Y.2d 454, 141
N.E.2d 589, 161 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1957). See generally R.M. PITL, N.Y. CmMNAL PRAcricz
UNDER THE CPL (1972).
29. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
This voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard is tantamount to the one used by
the Supreme Court to test the validity of a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel
under the sixth amendment. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). In order to
demonstrate that the plea was validly offered and accepted, a federal judge must make a
record of the proceedings for appellate review. FED. R. Cium. P. 11(g). The record must
also support a factual basis for the plea. FED. R. CiLM. P. 11(f).
By contrast, a New York court need not inquire into the factual basis for the plea if
the defendant was actively represented by counsel and was clearly aware of his rights.
E.g., People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 234 N.E.2d 687, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1968). If the defendant waived his right to counsel, it is then
incumbent upon the court to inquire into the underlying factual basis for the plea. Id.
See R.M. PrrLER, supra note 28.
30. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
31. Id. at 37.
32. In New York State, for the years 1973 to 1974, the guilty plea rate was 93.5%.
D. JONES, CRIMES WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 44 (1979). In New York County Criminal Court
in 1980, only 386 of the 67,365 cases filed resulted in a trial, less than one out of every
175 cases. Hochberger, Morgenthau Hits Shortage of City Judges, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12,
1981, at 1.
33. See Jung v. State, 32 Wis.2d 541, 145 N.W.2d 684 (1966), summarizing the vari-
ous forms a plea bargain can take:
These so-called deals may take the form of: (1) Pleading guilty to a reduced
charge, (2) pleading guilty to the charge upon the promise or expectation of a
recommendation for leniency, (3) concurrent sentences, and (4) dropped charges.
Id. at 546, 145 N.W.2d at 689.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/5
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the state.," Plea bargaining is generally welcomed by prosecutors
and judges because it is structured to avoid trials and clear
crowded court calendars without sacrificing convictions." Many
courts and prosecutors try to induce guilty pleas, and do so by
promising to dismiss certain charges or not impose the maxi-
mum sentence.36
Whatever the defendant decides is not without conse-
quence. If he refuses to plead guilty he risks answering to more
severe charges at trial and faces harsher punishment if con-
victed; if he does plead guilty he forfeits his right to appeal any
nonjurisdictional defects that may have occurred. 7 Critics have
argued for the conditional guilty plea to solve this dilemma."
34. It is the mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact that at pre-
sent well over three-quarters of the criminal convictions in this country rest on
pleas of guilty, a great many of them no doubt motivated at least in part by the
hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty
verdict after a trial to judge or jury.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 752.
35. Plea bargaining survived constitutional attack in Brady v. United States, id.
36. Guilty plea rates indicate the frequency at which defendants are convicted of
criminal charges without trial. As the guilty plea rate for a jurisdiction approaches
100%, doubt is cast on the readiness, willingness, or ability of either prosecutors
or defense counsel to take even a marginal case to trial. Indeed. . .it is doubtful
that courts possess the capacity to conduct more than a few "token" criminal tri-
als, even if counsel demanded them . ..
D. JoNzs, supra note 32, at 46.
37. The defendant who has meritorious claims or defenses is confronted with a
"Catch-22." Nevertheless, that a defendant may have made a tactical error in accepting
a plea bargain is not enough to vitiate the finality of the plea; the defendant must show
that his counsel lacked the competence demanded of criminal attorneys. See e.g., Mc-
Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at
757, the Court declared:
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long
after the plea has been asserted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of
the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.
Conversely, the defendant may obtain specific performance of the bargain, or at
least have his prior plea vacated if the state fails to keep its part of the bargain. See, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). A New York defendant is entitled to en-
forcement of his bargain only if he has lived up to his part of the bargain and placed
himself in a no-return position by exposing himself to considerable risk or sacrifice. Oth-
erwise, the plea is invalidated and the defendant is given an opportunity to plea anew.
E.g., People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 402 N.E.2d 113, 425 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1980);
Matter of Chapis v. State Liq. Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 57, 375 N.E.2d 32, 404 N.Y.S.2d 76
(1978). See Comment, Specific Enforcement to Ensure Due Process in Plea Bargaining,
21 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 521 (1979).
38. See generally UNW. R. OF CRIM. PROC. 444 (d) (1978) (allowing post-guilty plea
1982]
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B. Development of the Conditional Guilty Plea
1. Federal Courts
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the ac-
ceptability of the conditional guilty plea in the federal court sys-
tem. In Lefkowitz v. Newsome," however, the Court did recog-
nize New York's statutory procedure of allowing an appeal of a
denial of a suppression motion to survive a guilty plea.40 New-
some held that appeals pursuant to this statutory scheme were
cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding despite a prior
valid guilty plea.41 The Court distinguished the Brady Trilogy,4"
which held that a defendant may not, after a plea of guilty, chal-
lenge constitutional deprivations collateral to the plea itself, by
concluding that the district attorney had no expection of finality
in a guilty plea when the state gives the defendant a statutory
right to appeal certain issues.'8
The federal circuits, which have addressed the conditional
guilty plea, are divided as to its acceptability. 44 The Third Cir-
cuit has widely endorsed the plea even over the government's
appeals of orders denying suppression and other pre-trial motions, which if granted,
would be dispositive of the case); Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique Of Four Models,
41 LAW & CoNrTEMP. PROBS. 102 (1977); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE § II.I(d)
(1978); Comment, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 HARv. L. REv. 564 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Conditional Guilty Pleas]; Comment, Conditioned Guilty Pleas: Post Guilty
Plea Appeal of Nonjurisdictional Issues, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 360 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Post Guilty Plea]; Comment, Appellate Review of Constitutional Infirmities
Notwithstanding a Plea of Guilty, 9 Hous. L. REv. 305 (1971).
39. 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
40. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.70(2). See supra note 2.
41. But cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) holding that where the state has
provided an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim fed-
eral habeas corpus relief may not be granted.
42. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). See supra note 14.
43. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. at 289-90. The Court described New York's
statutory scheme as follows:
The guilty plea operates simply as a procedure by which the constitutional issues
can be litigated without the necessity of going through the time and effort of con-
ducting a trial, the result of which is foreordained if the constitutional claim is
invalid. The plea is entered with the clear understanding and expectation by the
State, the defendant, and the courts, that it will not foreclose judicial review of
the merits of the alleged constitutional violations.
Id.
44. See United States v. Depoli, 628 F.2d 779, 781 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 2:101
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objections,' 5 and has expressly relied on Newsome. In analogiz-
ing the conditional plea to New York's statutory procedure, the
Third Circuit stated that the United States Attorney had no le-
gitimate expectation of finality in the plea. It distinguished the
Brady Trilogy by reasoning that, unlike the traditional guilty
plea, a conditional plea does not bar appellate review, but guar-
antees it.46
According to the Third Circuit, the conditional guilty plea
would prevent "undue delays in the administration of justice
produced by unnecessary trials, and would also ease the crushing
financial burdens placed on the taxpayers who ultimately pay
the expenses of federal criminal legislation.' 7 The plea, in its
opinion, would help clear criminal trial calendars and reduce ap-
pellate dockets by limiting and narrowing the appealable
issues.'6
Other circuits approving the conditional guilty plea include
the Second" and D.C. Circuit,50 which will hear the conditional
plea when agreed to by the government and the court. The First
Circuit has also expressed some support for the plea,5 while the
Eighth Circuit62 has been reluctant to adopt it in the absence of
express legislative or Supreme Court authority.
The Ninth Circuit, in juxtaposition, has adamantly rejected
45. See United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978). See also United
States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 864 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Velasquez, 626
F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Schmidt, 604 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848
(3d Cir. 1975).
46. United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit stated
that the conditional guilty plea is not a constitutional right, but its approval is within
the district court's broad exercise of discretion in accepting pleas under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CalM. P. 11. See United States v. Moskow,
588 F.2d at 887.
47. United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d at 888.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Depoli, 628 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975);
United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
50. See, e.g., Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Weber, 664 F.2d 841, 852 n.9 (1st Cir.) (dictum), reh'g
denied, 668 F.2d 552 (1981); United States v. Decosta, 435 F.2d 630, 632 (1st Cir. 1970)
(dictum). See also United States v. Warwar, 478 F.2d 1183 (1st Cir. 1973) (dictum).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 459 F.2d 977, 978-79 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 880 (1972).
1982]
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the conditional plea.'8 Relying on the Brady Trilogy," and its
progeny, Toilet v. Henderson," the Ninth Circuit observed that
"a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty forecloses inquiry into
alleged antecedent constitutional deprivations. '"56 It noted that
the conditional plea would crowd appellate dockets with frivo-
lous claims, destroy the finality of the guilty plea, and unduly
benefit admittedly guilty defendants. 7 The Ninth Circuit re-
jected the notion that the prosecutor and the defendant can con-
tractually confer a right which the Supreme Court has said does
not exist." "Thus, while a plea bargain permits a defendant to
waive that to which he does have a right [i.e., a jury trial] . . . it
does not permit him to arrogate that to which he is clearly not
entitled."" s
The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits also expressly prohibit
the use of the conditional plea," and the Tenth Circuit appears
not to favor it."1 The Seventh Circuit disapproves the plea as a
matter of policy," but will honor it if the district court judge
gives the defendant reason to believe that the plea was
conditioned."
2. New York
Criminal defendants in New York have a statutory right to
appeal denials of suppression motions following a guilty plea."
53. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Superior Court, 632 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1978).
54. See supra note 14.
55. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). See supra note 14.
56. United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d at 510 (citing Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at
266-67).
57. United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d at 510. See also United States v. Cox, 464
F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1972).
58. United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d at 511.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 472 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sepe, 486 F.2d 1044 (5th
Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 1972)
("The defendants clearly want to have their cake while preserving their right to eat it at
some future date").
61. See, e.g., United States v. Nooner, 565 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1977) (dictum).
62. See United States v. Brown, 499 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1974).
63. See United States v. Michigan Carton Co., 552 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1977).
64. N.Y. CanM. PRoc. LAW § 710.70 (2). See supra note 2. Similar statutes exist in
California, 51 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1237.5, 1538.5 (M) (West Supp. 1981); Florida, FLA.
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The acceptability of the conditional guilty plea encompassing is-
sues outside this statutory scheme had not been directly ad-
dressed by the New York courts prior to Thomas."6
Several recent decisions, however, have concerned the final-
ity of the traditional guilty plea. In People v. Brothers," involv-
ing an appeal from a valid plea of guilty, the defendant claimed
that his statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated. The
court of appeals, in dicta, indicated that a statutory speedy trial
challenge" might be waived by a plea of guilty, "short possibly
of a court sanctioned agreement for preservation," even though a
STAT. ANN. § 924.06(3) (West Supp. 1981); Vermont, 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 7401 (1974),
and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.31(10) (1971).
Other states have recognized the conditional guilty plea by judicial decision. See,
e.g., Nickels v. State, 545 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1976); Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251
(Alaska 1974); State v. Mendoza, 376 So. 2d 139 (La. 1979); State v. Lain, 347 So. 2d 167
(La. 1977); State v. Crosby, 338 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976); State v. Lothenback, 296 N.W.2d
854 (Minn. 1980); Dorsey v. Cupp., 12 Or. App. 604, 508 P.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1973). Cf.
Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1979) (Florida will hear a conditional plea of nolo
contendere when the legal issue reserved for appeal is dispositive of the case).
Several other states have disapproved this procedure. See, e.g., State v. Arnsberg, 27
Ariz. App. 205, 553 P.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1976); Hurt v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 951
(Ky. 1960); State v. Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673 (Iowa 1971); State v. Turcotte, 164 Mont. 426,
524 P.2d 787 (1974); Killebrew v. State, 464 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
65. Several appellate division cases have indirectly concerned the conditional guilty
plea. See, e.g., People v. Argentine, 67 A.D. 2d 180, 414 N.Y.S. 2d 732 (1979), after re-
mand, 73 A.D. 2d 649, 422 N.Y.S. 2d 736 (1979) (ostensibly concerning a defendant's
reservation of a right to appeal following a plea of guilty where the defendant specifically
reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. The
challenge, however, concerned the state's breach of its original promise to drop a felony
charge to a misdemeanor in return for a guilty plea. Thus, the appeal was based upon
the validity of the plea itself, and not upon a nonjurisdictional claim); People v. Gilliam,
65 A.D.2d 533, 409 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st Dep't 1978) (in dicta, noting that not even a condi-
tional plea would allow the defendant, after a plea of guilty, to claim on appeal that his
potential rights to cross-examine witnesses as to their prior convictions and arrests under
People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974), were vio-
lated by an incorrect trial ruling. The court stated that "the right to appeal in criminal
cases is statutory, and no statute provides for a review of a Sandoval ruling after a plea
of guilty, [thus], even an express reservation of a claimed right to appeal at the time of
taking the plea would be ineffective." People v. Gilliam, 65 A.D.2d at 533, 409 N.Y.S.2d
at 401. But see People v. Maxim, 58 A.D.2d 674, 395 N.Y.S.2d 738 (3d Dep't 1976) and
People v. Poole, 52 A.D.2d 1010, 383 N.Y.S.2d 688 (3d Dep't 1975) (where the Third
Department, without expressly discussing the waiver issue, considered the merits of San-
doval rulings following guilty pleas)).
66. 50 N.Y.2d 413, 407 N.E.2d 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1980).
67. See also People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351, 354 n.1, 406 N.E.2d 793, 794 n.1, 428
N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 n.1 (1980).
68. N.Y. CaiM. PRoc. LAw § 30.30 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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constitutional speedy trial claim would not be waived." The
court of appeals has made a similar distinction between statu-
tory and constitutional double jeopardy claims.70 Thus, the court
of appeals appears to be strengthening the finality of the tradi-
tional guilty plea by suggesting that speedy trial 1 and double
jeopardy challenges 7 3-two jurisdictional exceptions to the final-
ity of the traditional guilty plea-might require a conditional
guilty plea to survive for appellate review when statutorily,
rather than constitutionally, based. 3
In People v. Mack,74 the court of appeals continued to aug-
ment the finality of the traditional guilty plea by holding that "a
defendant cannot by a unilateral recital of an intention or desire
to preserve a legal contention evade what would otherwise be
the consequence of his guilty plea."5 Thomas carries Mack a
step further by addressing the situation where the plea has been
consented to by the prosecutor and sanctioned by the trial court.
III. Decision of the Court
A. Appellate Division
The appellate division, after analyzing the evolution of the
conditional guilty plea and the competing policy arguments,
69. People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d at 418, 407 N.E.2d at 409, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
The court declined to so rule because the prosecutor did not raise the claim. Id.
70. People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979).
71. The New York courts have held that the constitutional right to a speedy trial
survives a guilty plea and may be raised on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Blakely, 34
N.Y.2d 311, 313 N.E.2d 763, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1974); People v. Wallace, 26 N.Y.2d 371,
258 N.E.2d 904, 310 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1970); People v. Chirieleison, 3 N.Y.2d 170, 143
N.E.2d 914, 164 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1957). Other jurisdictions, however, have held that a
speedy trial claim is a nonjurisdictional challenge and can be waived by a plea of guilty.
See, e.g., Speed v. United States, 518 F.2d 75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Camp v.
United States, 423 U.S. 998 (1975); United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974).
72. Double jeopardy challenges have uniformly been held to be jurisdictional claims.
See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 473 U.S. 61 (1975); People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 394
N.E.2d 1134, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979).
73. The distinction between statutory and constitutional jurisdictional challenges
created by the New York Court of Appeals remains an unsettled area of the law. The
First Department, however, has recently held that an appeal from a denial of a statutory
double jeopardy claim followed by a plea of guilty was proper. People v. Lieberman, 79
A.D.2d 175, 436 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1981).
74. 53 N.Y.2d 803, 422 N.E.2d 572, 439 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1981).
75. Id. at 806, 422 N.E.2d at 573, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (emphasis added).
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held that "the procedure by which the defendant pleaded guilty
to the charges against him, but reserved certain rights for ap-
peal," was procedurally improper. 6
Judge Lazer, speaking for a unanimous court, viewed the
Brady Trilogy" in light of Menna v. New York 8 and concluded
that "[a] guilty plea. . . simply renders irrelevant those consti-
tutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid estab-
lishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of
conviction if factual guilt is validly established. ' 79
This construction was premised on the fact that jurisdic-
tional objections going to the right of the state to conduct a trial,
and not to the question of factual guilt, are not waived by a
valid guilty plea.80 Thomas, the court asserted, was seeking a re-
view of factual guilt following an admission of factual guilt, an
appeal "not logically or legally consistent with the plea."81
The court noted that section 710.70(2) reinforced its convic-
tion that the guilty plea waives issues "which assume irrelevance
once guilt has been admitted.' a8 Guilty pleas, the court ob-
served, result primarily from an agreement to reduce the charges
or punishment. Thus, the court concluded that "the hearing of
appeals based upon conditional pleas by those who have ob-
tained the benefits of this bargaining process is incompatible
76. People v. Thomas, 74 A.D.2d 317, 428 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1980).
77. See supra note 14.
78. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
79. Id. at 63 n.2. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
80. People v. Thomas, 74 A.D.2d at 325, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
81. Id. at 325, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
82. Id. at 325, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
The Second Department has previously expressed discontent with New York's stat-
utory right to appeal suppression motions following guilty pleas:
In view of the many cases now coming before our appellate courts in which
defendants plead guilty (usually after a negotiated plea) and then, as here, take an
appeal upon a claim of improper denial of their motions to suppress evidence,
perhaps the time has come for the Legislature to consider the advisability of
amending the statute so as to preclude appeals under such circumstances. Is it too
much to say to a defendant that if he wants to attack the invalidity of the sup-
pression order he may only do so after standing trial? We do not believe there
would be any constitutional impediment to the enactment of such a statute. Our
suggestion is limited to suppression motions and not, for example, to speedy trial
motions.
People v. Navarro, 61 A.D.2d 534, 536, 403 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (2d Dep't 1978).
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with principles of the sound administration of justice.""' Be-
cause of this analysis, the court, in discussing whether or not the
conditional guilty plea would promote or jeopardize judicial
economy, merely recognized the competing claims, but did not
engage in the debate."
B. The Court of Appeals
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the appellate di-
vision's decision.85 Judge Meyers defined the policy question as
involving "the forfeiture of the right to appellate review, as dis-
tinct from preservation or express waiver,"" and found that
where permitted, "most such pleas involve the reservation of
search and seizure issues. '87 Since New York, by section
710.70(2) adequately protects a defendant's rights under the ex-
clusionary rule,88 the court reasoned that "the major ameliora-
tive purpose of the conditional plea device has. . . already been
achieved." 8' 9 Because of this statutory right to appeal suppres-
sion motions following a guilty plea, and because the defendant
was merely challenging "the sufficiency of conceded facts to sup-
port a judgment of conviction entered upon a plea of guilty,"'
the court found it unnecessary to consider "the competing policy
considerations with respect to all of the possible issues that
83. People v. Thomas, 74 A.D.2d at 325, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
84. For example, the court alluded to the Ninth Circuit's fear that the plea could
lead to the overcrowding of appellate dockets, see supra text accompanying note 58, and
also recognized United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882, 888 (3d Cir. 1978) where the
Third Circuit argued that the procedure would aid judicial economy. See supra notes 47-
48 and accompanying text.
85. People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 338, 424 N.E.2d 538, 441 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1981).
86. Id. at 342 n.2, 424 N.E.2d at 539 n.2, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 652 n.2. The court ex-
plained that "preservation concerns whether an issue had been properly brought to the
attention of the Trial Judge and opposing attorneys," and express waiver "results from
'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'" Id. (cit-
ing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937)). Forfeiture, by contrast, "occurs by oper-
ation of law as a consequence of a guilty plea, with respect to issues which as a matter of
policy the law does not permit to survive such a plea." The conditional guilty plea, by
definition, renders irrelevant the issues of preservation or express waiver since the defen-
dant has expressly preserved, not waived, his right to appeal. People v. Thomas, 53
N.Y.2d at 342 n.2, 424 N.E.2d at 539 n.2, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 652 n.2.
87. People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d at 344, 424 N.E.2d at 540, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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could be the subject of a conditional plea."'
The court agreed with the Second Department that policy
militated against recognizing Thomas's appeal "because of the
logical inconsistency involved in permitting a defendant to enter
a plea of guilty and, at the same time, with the consent of the
prosecutor and the approval of the court, obtain appellate re-
view of the legal sufficiency of evidence that would hypotheti-
cally have been adduced at trial to support conviction of the
crime.. . ."9' The court limited its holding to appeals seeking
review of the conceded facts to justify the admitted crime, and
left for "another day consideration of other permutations of the
problem."98
IV. Analysis
Both the appellate division and the court of appeals were
correct in rejecting the conditional guilty plea. Nevertheless, be-
cause neither court sufficiently analyzed the competing policy
considerations, and because the court of appeals limited its
holding to the facts, it is necessary to examine the ramifications
of, and the competing policy considerations surrounding, the
conditional guilty plea.
A. The Logical Inconsistency
The conditional guilty plea has been primarily sanctioned in
the context of fourth amendment search and seizure claims." As
to these claims, the argument for the conditional plea is more
persuasive. Fourth amendment claims, in this regard similar to
jurisdictional challenges, are not concerned with guilt, but with
91. Id.
92. Id. at 344, 424 N.E.2d at 540, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
93. Id. The court affirmed the appellate division's remand to permit Thomas to
plead anew. See supra note 11. But see United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.
1972) (disapproving the conditional guilty plea, but willing to entertain the particular
appeal before it in recognition of the bargain agreed to by the parties).
94. E.g., People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d at 344, 424 N.E.2d at 540, 441 N.Y.S.2d at
653; see, e.g., United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Schmidt, 604 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir.
1978); State v. Mendoza, 376 So.2d 139 (La. 1977); State v. Lain, 347 So.2d 187 (La.
1977); State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1980); but see, e.g., United States v.
Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1979).
19821
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the legality of the contested search or seizure." In fact, in pos-
sessory crimes the defendant must at least concede a "privacy
interest" in the contested evidence to have standing to raise the
claim. 96 Thus, the admission of factual guilt does not render the
ancillary challenge under the exclusionary rule irrelevant since
the courts, in ruling on a suppression motion, are concerned with
the legal admissibility of evidence, and not with the defendant's
factual guilt.
After a denial of a suppression motion, a defendant who be-
lieves that he will be convicted will often plead guilty.9 Section
710.70(2) allows for appellate review of these claims and, there-
fore, adequately prevents needless trials." It is a reasoned deci-
sion by the legislature consistent with the exclusionary rule and
with the aim towards alleviating the crowded criminal courts.
Judicially extending this legislative scheme to claims not author-
ized by statute would encourage appellate review of issues irrele-
vant once factual guilt has been admitted. Thomas correctly
states that issues which become irrelevant once factual guilt has
been admitted should not be heard on appeal."
1. Thomas's Claims
Thomas illustrates the flaws of the conditional guilty plea.
Thomas asked the court to review whether the provable facts
were sufficient to constitute the crime of reckless endanger-
ment.100 Specifically, he claimed that the stipulated facts did not
support a finding that he acted with "a depraved indifference to
95. Generally, items seized illegally cannot be used as evidence against the defen-
dant at the criminal trial. Its admissibility must be decided by the judge outside the
presence of the jury. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1968). Justifications for the
exclusionary rule center on maintaining judicial integrity and on deterring illegal police
conduct. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). These ideals, not the factual guilt of the
defendant, are the primary concern.
96. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
97. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
98. See supra note 2. In Newsome, the Supreme Court recognized this statutory
procedure only to the extent that it allowed the federal courts to hear these claims in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding, see supra note 39 and accompanying text. Newsome
did not authorize the conditional guilty plea since Newsome's right to appeal arose by
statute, not by a negotiated plea.
99. People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d at 344, 424 N.E.2d at 540, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
100. See supra note 9.
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human life." 10 1 This contention, however, did not come from a
man who steadfastly maintained that he lacked the necessary
state of mind.102 A criminal defendant should not be allowed to
admit to the crime in his allocution and later contend that a
necessary element of the crime was lacking.103 The accused's
state of mind is a question of fact, and he or she should not be
able to circumvent the fact finding process because of a fear that
on the basis of conceded provable facts a jury would convict.104
To hold otherwise would allow a defendant to admit to murder
on the condition that he be allowed to argue the fine degrees of
intent before the appellate courts, an absurdity further exagger-
ated since the record would consist only of the undeveloped
facts in the plea allocution. These stipulated facts, "negotiated"
by the parties, would reflect their subjective versions of the
truth. The fact-finding process would be conducted first at the
"bargaining table," and then before the appellate courts.
Thomas also claimed that the presumption of possession of
weapons statute was unconstitutional as applied, and that his
plea of guilty to the weapon charges was the result of this statu-
tory presumption of possession.105 It was Thomas's admission to
the weapon charges that resulted in his conviction, however, not
101. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 1975). Thomas's basic contention was
that driving recklessly down an empty street at 2:30 a.m. did not evince a depraved
indifference to human life because he saw no pedestrians. See supra note 9. Thomas,
however, by admitting to the crime necessarily admitted to acting with a depraved mind.
After receiving the benefits of a plea bargain, he asked the appellate courts to rule on his
defense to the crime, a defense which he forfeited -by pleading guilty.
102. See supra note 101. If this were the case, the trial court could not have ac-
cepted the plea without inquiring into the defendant's claim of innocence. People v.
Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 234 N.E.2d 687, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1067 (1968); see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1976). See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
103. It was never alleged that Thomas did not know that a "depraved mind" was a
necessary element of reckless endangerment. Cf. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637
(1976) (the court may not accept a plea of guilty to a charge of second degree murder
when the defendant is not informed that intent to cause death is an element of that
offense). Rather, the circumstances surrounding the plea conclusively demonstrated the'
contrary since it was the requisite state of mind which Thomas challenged at the time of
his plea allocution. See supra note 9.
104. In effect, Thomas conceded "round one" of the judicial process (the trial), and
jumped to "round two" (the appeal) in the hope that the appellate court would more
favorably review the facts.
105. See supra note 10.
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the presumption statute. No presumption was necessary. It is il-
logical to pretermit the issue of guilt to reach the constitutional-
ity of a presumption statute that need not even be invoked by
the prosecutor. Thomas's objection went to the prospect that
the presumption statute that need not even be invoked by the
prosecutor. Thomas's objection went to the prospect that the
presumption statute would be used at trial. Essentially, the con-
ditional plea was a disguised interlocutory appeal requesting the
appellate court to order that the use of the presumption statute
at Thomas's trial would be unconstitutional as applied to the
facts. Such a procedure threatens both the speedy dispositon of
criminal trials and the finality of the plea bargaining process."e
B. Policy Considerations
Despite the legal contradictions the conditional plea would
foster, proponents sanction the procedure because: (1) It is nec-
essary to cure the dilemma that plea bargaining imposes upon
criminal defendants; and (2) the conditional plea is necessary to
achieve manageable court dockets.110 The conditional plea, how-
106. To ensure the speedy disposition of criminal cases and the finality of the plea
bargaining process, proponents of the conditional guilty plea assert that the plea is
proper when the issue to be resolved is dispositive of the case. See generally, Comment,
Post Guilty Pleas, supra note 38, at 367 ("[a]cceptance of a conditional plea is generally
proper only when the issue reserved is determinative of the government's ability to con-
vict the defendant"); UNIF. R. oF CraM. PRoC. 444(d), supra note 38. Thomas's claims are
ostensibly of this nature since the district attorney agreed to drop the charges if
Thomas's appeal proved successful. This case, however, demonstrates that such appeals
would often result in a remand to further develop the record and, thus, appellate resolu-
tion of the issues would not always obviate the need for further proceedings before the
trial court. For instance, the appellate division determined that they could not rule on
the weapon charges on the basis of the stipulated facts. People v. Thomas, 74 A.D.2d at
326, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 27. For example, the court needed to know whether the weapons
could have slid from under the driver's side to under the rear seat where they were
found, and whether it was possible for Thomas to retrieve the weapons from the driver's
seat. Id. at 325-26, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
The reckless endangerment charge also appears to warrant further factual develop-
ment beyond those facts agreed to in the record. For example, Thomas's familiarity with
the streets and the likelihood that pedestrians would appear at 2:30 a.m. on these streets
need amplification and bear on the issue of his intent. See supra note 9.
Therefore, whether the issue to be resolved is dispositive of the case should not
justify the conditional plea. In fact, in fourth amendment claims where the plea makes
the most sense, reversals may be accompanied by remands to determine if the state can
still prove its case.
107. See Comment, Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra note 38; Comment, Post Guilty
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ever, would do neither.
1. The Dilemma
Plea bargaining, whether viewed favorably or not, has be-
come an integral part of our criminal justice system.'"e The Su-
preme Court, in Santobello v. New York, 1 '9 stated that
[t]he disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bar-
gaining," is an essential component of the administration of jus-
tice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every crimi-
nal charge were subjected to a fullscale trial, the States and the
Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities.11°
In order to alleviate overcrowded criminal calendars, which
result from an increased crime rate, society, through plea bar-
gaining, must treat criminal defendants more leniently than they
could otherwise if jury convictions could be obtained."' Propo-
nents of the conditional plea, nevertheless, assert that defen-
dants suffer from a dilemma of constitutional proportions: Ei-
ther plead not guilty and risk harsher punishment, but preserve
rights to appeal, or plead guilty and benefit from a bargain, but
forfeit appellate rights.
Although defendants who are convicted after trials generally
receive harsher punishment than those who plead guilty,112 once
plea bargaining is recognized as vital to the timely disposition of
criminal cases, the possibility of harsher punishment after a trial
Plea, supra note 38. See note 37 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 33 to 36 and accompanying text.
109. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
110. Id. at 260.
111. See Comment, Post Guilty Plea, supra note 38.
Defendants convicted after trial generally receive longer sentences than those who
plead guilty. One study has determined that the extent to which the punishment
diminishes for a defendant pleading guilty varies from 10% to 95% of the punish-
ment that would ordinarily be given after a trial resulting in a conviction.
Id. at 365 n.23 (citing Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determi-
nation of Sentence, 66 YA.a L.J. 204, 206-07 (1956)).
112. See supra note 111. Ironically, the conditional guilty plea discourages the need
to accept pleas to reduced charges since the prosecutor could offer the right to appeal
instead. Thus, if the claim is denied, the defendant could conceivably be punished more
severely than if the conditional guilty plea did not exist.
1982]
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becomes a necessary element.s A prosecutor does not violate a
defendant's legal rights by pressing for the maximum legal sen-
tence or by bringing charges which have a basis in law.114 There-
fore, that the defendant may have pleaded guilty out of fear of
receiving harsher treatment if convicted after trial is inapposite.
Criminal defendants should not be given both the benefits of a
plea bargain and the right to appeal as if innocence had been
maintained.
2. Judicial Economy
Neither the court of appeals nor the Second Department ex-
pressly rejected the conditional guilty plea because of a fear that
such pleas would flood appellate dockets. Judicial economy,
however, was also at stake. Supporters of the conditional plea
argue that this procedure would help clear trial calendars and
reduce appellate dockets by limiting and narrowing the issues
for review. This argument, however, misconceives the plea bar-
gaining process.
As already stated, the vast majority of criminal cases in
New York are disposed of through pleas of guilty.11 6 These pleas
are tendered only after a counseled defendant has surveyed his
options. It is a strategic act designed to make the best of a seri-
ous personal predicament. Assuming that the conditional plea is
recognized, a significant number of defendants who would have
pleaded guilty unconditionally would now plead guilty condi-
tionally. Thus, a certain number of cases which would have been
finally disposed of would now present appealable issues. Unfor-
113. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) stating:
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment
clearly may have a "discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial
rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable"-and permissi-
ble-"attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the nego-
tiation of pleas."
Id. at 364 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)).
114. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, stating:
In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally resta
entirely in his discretion.
Id. at 364. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBELrry DR 7-103(A) (1979).
115. See supra note 32.
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tunately, it is not unlikely that the prosecutor and trial judge
would allow superfluous issues to survive for appellate review if
necessary to avoid a trial."" Further, the small percentage of de-
fendants who go to trial do so because: (1) They are innocent,
have valid defenses, or the evidence against them is perceived as
weak; or (2) they are offenders of serious crimes and are unable
to negotiate an acceptable bargain." A conditional guilty plea
would not significantly discourage this class of litigants from go-
ing to trial.
More importantly, appellate resolution of issues in favor of
the defendant would rarely, if ever, be held to be harmless error.
For instance, in no case involving an appeal from a plea of guilty
pursuant to section 710.70(2) has an appellate court relied on
the harmless error rule to affirm a conviction. '1 8 In People v.
Grant," 91 the court of appeals stated that "[w]hen the conviction
is based on a plea-instead of a verdict--[the standard] must at
least be . . . whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
error contributed to the plea."1 0 Therefore, an appeal from a
conviction pursuant to either section 710.70(2) or a conditional
guilty plea could not be saved by the harmless error rule since
almost any adverse ruling would contribute to a defendant's de-
cision to plead guilty."1 A procedural device which can lead to
116. The conditional guilty plea would be frequently offered during plea negotia-
tions as an incentive for the defendant to plead guilty and forego trial. That district
attorneys may favor this procedure is evidenced by the fact that it was the state, not
Thomas, that appealed the appellate division's refusal to recognize the conditional guilty
plea. See supra note 11.
117. See D. JoNEs, supra note 32.
118. See People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 377, 380 N.E.2d 257, 263-64, 408 N.Y.S.2d
429, 435 (1978).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 378, 380 N.E.2d at 264, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 436. Accord Jones v. Wisconsin,
562 F.2d 440, 445-46 (7th Cir. 1977); People v. Hill, 12 Cal.3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (1974); State v. Monahan, 76 Wis.2d 387, 251 N.W.2d 421 (1977). Cf. United
States v. Weber, 664 F.2d 841, 852 (1st Cir.), reh'g denied, 668 F.2d 552 (1981) (agreed
that a court cannot speculate that a defendant's reasons for pleading guilty would have
been the same absent the "harmless" evidence, and applied this reasoning to a defen-
dant's decision to waive a jury trial and stipulate to the facts). See infra notes 123-26
and accompanying text.
121. The court in People v. Grant concluded that:
In sum, when a conviction is based on a plea of guilty, an appellate court will
rarely, if ever, be able to determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to
suppress contributed to the defendant's decision, unless at the time of the plea he
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reversal despite harmless error hardly promotes judicial
economy. 2
To appeal the defendant need only refrain from pleading
guilty. If a defendant desires an expeditious resolution of his
case and a degree of official leniency, he can waive his right to a
jury trial and re-assert his denied contentions on appeal.128 The
trial judge, in his discretion, can also allow the parties to stipu-
late to the facts.12 ' Stipulation, however, can create a set of facts
more closely reflecting the parties' relative bargaining power
than a detached, objective finding.12 5 Thus, the court should be
hesitant to allow stipulation, and when allowed, should hold an
evidentiary hearing to develop any additional necessary facts not
encompassed by the stipulation."'
C. Other Permutations of the Problem.
The court of appeals expressly reserved for another day
"other permutations of the problem ' 12 7 by limiting its holding to
a situation where the sufficiency of the conceded facts is chal-
lenged to constitute 'the admitted crime. 28 The New York
states or reveals his reason for pleading guilty.
People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 380 N.E.2d at 265, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
122. Accord United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 945 (6th Cir. 1972) (rejecting the
conditional guilty plea since it could lead to reversal despite harmless error).
123. It may be argued that this procedure of waiving a jury trial still encourages
needless trials, but it would allow a defendant to obtain a degree of leniency, see, e.g.,
J.E. BoND, supra note 3, at § 2.06(1) (sentencing reflects the amount of trouble an obvi-
ously guilty individual has caused officials in insisting upon his trial rights), and more
importantly, the appeal would not be from an admittedly guilty defendant. Certainty in
the plea bargaining process would be preserved. See United States v. Mizell, 488 F.2d 97
(5th Cir. 1973).
124. If the trial court would allow the parties in Thomas to stipulate to the facts for
the purposes of a conditional guilty plea, it could also permit it for the defendant who
goes to trial seeking a speedy disposition of the matter before exercising his appellate
rights. Judicial time would be saved on the theory that the trial court would give "the
matter more than pro forma approval." United States v. Weber, 664 F.2d 841, 852 n.9
(1st Cir.), reh'g denied, 668 F.2d 552 (1981).
125. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text. Thomas demonstrates that a
record formed by stipulation might be an inadequate basis for the appellate courts to
rule. See supra note 106. Stipulation to the facts can also be disadvantageous to the
defendant in that appealable trial errors are not likely to occur.
126. Cf. United States v. Weber, 664 F.2d at 843.
127. People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d at 344, 424 N.E.2d at 540, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
128. Id. at 340, 424 N.E.2d at 538, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
[Vol. 2:101
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/5
PEOPLE v. THOMAS
courts, as a matter of policy and deference to the legislature,
should be hesitant to recognize the plea in the myriad of other
potential situations in which it can arise.
Section 710.70(2) allows certain claims to survive a plea of
guilty that are not inconsistent with the defendant's admission
of factual guilt.1 2e The legislature, in enacting section 710.70(2),
has proven innovative in providing for appellate rights in certain
instances despite a valid plea of guilty.130 As to other pre-trial or
trial rulings outside the statute, the courts should defer to this
legislative judgment.131
V. Conclusion
The New York Court of Appeals correctly refrained from
creating a form of pleading not authorized by statute."' A crimi-
nal defendant should not be given both the benefits of a negoti-
ated plea and the right to appeal as if factual guilt had been
denied. The conditional guilty plea would destroy the finality of
the guilty plea by allowing a guilty defendant to obtain the leni-
129. See supra note 2, and notes 97-99 and accompanying text. Issues concerning an
illegal search and seizure, eavesdropping, illegally obtained statement, or identification
testimony, all within section 710.70(2), are less concerned with guilt than with prohibit-
ing the use of illegally obtained evidence in court. Other situations, such as motions to
obtain an advance ruling on the permissible scope of cross examination as to prior crimi-
nal activity should the defendant decide to take the stand, see People v. Sandoval, 34
N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974); supra note 65, imnplicate both the
desire to prohibit impermissible evidence and the need to protect an allegedly innocent
defendant. A plea of guilty coupled with a subsequent claim that a legal right primarily
designed to protect an allegedly innocent defendant has been violated is patently incon-
sistent with the plea itself. Cf. People v. Gilliam, 65 A.D.2d 533, 409 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1st
Dep't 1978), supra note 65. In any event, these factors are for the legislature to balance
and section 710.70(2) represents their judgment.
130. Only four other states have legislated a similar procedure, see supra note 64.
131. See supra note 129. This analysis does not prevent the courts from resolving
the issue left open in People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 407 N.E.2d 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d
558 (1980), and People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371
(1979), see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text, in favor of requiring a conditional
guilty plea to allow a statutory speedy trial or double jeopardy challenge to survive for
appellate review since these claims are of a jurisdictional nature, and therefore, not
within the statutory exception to the nonappealability of nonjuridictional challenges.
132. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw § 220.10 (McKinney 1971) authorizes only pleas of "not
guilty" and "guilty."
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ent treatment of a plea bargain and by affording him the oppor-
tunity to challenge his admitted guilt on appeal.
Gerard A. Riso
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